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ABSTRACT

THE ART OF SCOUTING: HOW ANALYTICS IS USED IN MODERN DAY
SCOUTING FOR MAJOR LEAGUE FRONT OFFICES
Mitchell Henshaw

There are many aspects to the game of baseball that many individuals are unaware
of. One of these aspects is how scouting is conducted and the purpose of their job.
Throughout this paper, you will get a better understanding of what scouts look for in
players. There are different roles for scouts and each team has a different philosophy.
Many teams are continuing to incorporate more analytics in their scouting departments.
In this paper, you will read examples from scouts on current and former MLB players.
You will notice how technology has changed the game over time. Finding a player’s
value is the million-dollar question that all organizations are trying to figure out. The use
of analytical tools has enhanced their discoveries on this topic. You will look at an
example of what front offices would use in Excel to try and find value. Through Excel,
you can run correlation and regression tables to test your theories. Every ounce of
analytical information is used throughout the process of baseball. Whether that is in the
front office, scouting departments, or on the field. Everyone is always trying to
strengthen their game and analytics has stepped up its role in this process.
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Introduction
When you think baseball, the first thing that comes to the minds of many is a
hot summer day, hot dogs, fireworks, or kids playing a pickup game at the local park.
It is America’s pastime, the game that is loved by so many people around the country
and world. When a fan buys a ticket to a Major League Baseball game, they most
likely are not thinking about the strategy or finer details about each player. But up in
the press boxes, or down in the dugout, the game of baseball is seen much differently
than most think.
Since the start of the major leagues in 1869 until now, there has been
monumental changes to the game. None may be bigger than what we are experiencing
now with the coming of analytics in every organization. What many fans and people
forget, is that baseball is a business. The game we love is a multi-billion-dollar
organization that is structured around winning and making money. When you dive
deeper into the minds of the owners, general managers, and managers, you will find
out that analytics is playing a huge role in the game. It starts with something as
simple as drafting a player, to a manage using a defensive shift in a game because a
hitter has an 85% chance to hit a baseball to the right side of the field. Due to all these
numbers, there has been a shift in the game in how it is played and structured.
So much of this new trend of technology is revolved around scouting. The
amateur draft has always been a way to produce the next all-stars and hall of famers
in an organization. We are seeing the days of “old school” scouting, take a back seat
to the new analytical approach.
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New approaches seem to be coming to baseball year in and year out. Scouts
and major league front offices are constantly adapting and learning new approaches
that may help them win a World Series. The following chapters attempt to explain
how the scouting industry has changed with this new analytical approach. There will
be aspects that an old school baseball fan may never have heard about. Everyone is
constantly trying to learn and better themselves no matter what business you are in,
and baseball is certainly no exception.
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History of Scouting
America’s pastime, baseball. Major League Baseball has been around for
nearly 150 years. Everywhere you looked, there was always someone playing a
pickup game of baseball. It is the game that is dearest to more Americans hearts. The
love of the game is what keeps people into it and want to stick around forever. It gives
you that feeling that you can be a kid forever if you are involved in baseball. Playing
the game of baseball is not the only way that you can stick around, there are countless
opportunities for an individual to be a part of the game they love. Of course, we
would all love to play the game forever, but this is something that is impossible for us
all. There is one way that catches the eye of former players though, and that is
scouting.
Scouting was introduced to the game in the 1950’s, but it was very vague and
there was not much to a scouting report at all. When Major League Baseball
implemented a draft in the 1960’s, scouting changed for the betterment of the game. A
lot of questions may come up when thinking about scouting baseball players. What
exactly do they do or what are they looking for? These are very common questions a
scout may get along the way from local people.
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Figure 1: 1965 Scouting Report

Wulf, Steve. “Scout's Honor.” ESPN, ESPN Internet Ventures, 30 Apr. 2013,
https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/9228875/scouts-exhibit-baseball-hof.

This is a scouting report from 1965 on a young sophomore pitcher out of
U.S.C named Tom Seaver. This is the same Tom Seaver that was inducted into the
Hall of Fame in 1992. In this scouting report, you will see that there is not a whole lot
to it. You can see one paragraph about the players ability and that is it. There are a
few things that stand out from this report from Dodger’s scout Tom Lasorda. What
stands out the most is next to “Fast Ball” it says, “73 with life”. This is showing that
his fastball was recorded at 73 mph and showed good life which implements that it
gets on the hitter quick.
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When the Dodgers drafted Seaver in 1965, this is the only report they had on
him. All they knew is he had good life on his fastball, good command, has plenty of
desire to pitch, and he wants to beat you. This was enough knowledge for them to
give Seaver a $40,000 signing bonus.
Figure 2: 1975 Scouting Report

Paul Molitor Scouting Report, 1974 May 30.” Paul Molitor Scouting Report, 1974 May 30 |
Digital Collection, https://collection.baseballhall.org/PASTIME/paul-molitor-scouting-report-1974may-30.

This is an improved report from 1975 on hall of famer Paul Molitor. As you
can see, there are only a few changes from Tom Seaver’s in 1965. In a ten-year span,
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they have expanded a little, but nothing too crazy. The biggest addition is the section
where the scout has the opportunity to write about the players strengths and
weaknesses. Typically, this was done by a scout in the section at the bottom where
you just describe the player. Even with this section being added, there is still not
much being said in those areas. This scout wrote a strength and weakness in one
sentence.
What stands out the most in this report is the scout describing Molitor at the
bottom. In this entire report, there is not much analysis on his actual play. Over time,
we will see how much this has changed especially in today’s game.
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Figure 3: 1985 Scouting Report

Muder, C. (n.d.). #shortstops: Bo jackson scouting report documents one of Sport's Greatest Athletes.
Baseball Hall of Fame. Retrieved December 23, 2021, from https://baseballhall.org/discover/shortThis isstops/bo-jackson-scouting-report
a scouting report from 1985 on famous athlete Bo Jackson. Bo at

the

time was playing baseball and football at Auburn University. Just from first sight,
there is a lot more aspects to this scouting report in comparison to Tom Seaver’s and
Paul Molitor’s. Starting from the top, you have the players basic information
including name, height, weight, and when the player is eligible for the draft. After that
there is a big chart showing a lot of numbers, this is called the 20-80 scale. What this
means, is each player is graded from 20-80 based on their skills with every attribute.
The main five attributes a player is looked at for his ability to hit, hit for power, arm

7

strength, speed, and fielding. As you can see on the report above, there are a few other
areas that they are evaluating Jackson on such as base running, arm accuracy, and
range. On the left side of the chart, you will see what the 20-80 scale means. For
example, the 20 refers to a poor set of skill whereas the 80 refers to outstanding.
Looking at Bo Jackson’s report, you will see for just about every attribute, he
is graded between 6-7 with a few of them seeing 8 potential. There are not many
players a scout will go and watch where they will fill out a scouting report like this
one. Jackson would be referred to as a “5-tool player” in reference to his ability to hit,
hit for power, arm strength, speed, and fielding.
After the chart, there are a few sections where the scout has an opportunity to
describe the player and show off why he wants this player to get drafted. The first
section is the players physical description. This is to show what kind of build the
player has and how well it may translate to a baseball field. Following the physical
description, the scout goes into the players strengths and weaknesses. The scout has
an opportunity to show the players worth in these sections and describe how he will
be able to help the organization if they draft him. Signability is the next section. This
is in reference to the chance the organization has to sign the player if the organization
drafts him. In this specific report with Bo Jackson, the scout checks off the box next
to “poor”, stating he believes Bo will not sign until his senior year. He gives the
amount of $200,000 to what he believes Jackson would sign for. After reading this
report, the scout was very high on Bo Jackson and would really love to have the
opportunity for his team to sign him. Very few times in history have teams come
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Figure 4: 1995 Scouting Report

across a report that looks as good as this one does in reference to how good the player
is.
In 1995, scout George Bradley found recent hall of famer Roy Halladay. This
report is very similar to the one of Bo Jackson in 1985. It appears that they made the
scouting reports more efficiently with less writing and boxes. We can see that the top
is still the players basic information. Following that, we see the 20-80 scale again.
This scale will be used on every single prospect, no matter their position.
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We can see at this point in baseball, the scouting role has become more
prominent and important. Reading the strengths and weaknesses of Halladay’s report,
the scout expands on the aspects of Halladay’s performance. It is no longer just a
basic sentence about a player’s skillset. Regarding Halladay’s fastball, we see in the
box there is a section for “life”. This is in reference to how the ball is coming in out
of the pitcher’s hand. Halladay was graded at a 60 which is very impressive for an 18year-old pitcher.
Halladay is described as a power pitcher. It also says his average velocity was
at 92 mph which over time, you will realize how much the term “power pitcher” has
changed in comparison to today’s game and metrics.
Scout Bradley saw a lot in this young man and valued him at $400,000. He
believed in Halladay’s skillset and that he will mature and grow into his body. With
this, his fastball would only get better. He was hoping as he matured, his command
and delivery would get better, and it did. Roy Halladay was inducted into the hall of
fame in 2019. The hardest job for a scout is being able to predict what a player will
look like in five years. Scout Bradley saw something special in a young Halladay, and
he did not fail to deliver.
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Figure 5: 2005 Scouting Report

“Freddie Freeman Scouting Report, 2005 July 01.” Freddie Freeman Scouting Report, 2005 July 01 |
Digital Collection, https://collection.baseballhall.org/PASTIME/freddie-freeman-scoutingreport-2005-july-01.

In 2005, we see that metrics were slowly making their way into baseball.
Scouts now start using stop watches to analyze a lot. Although this may have been a
tactic used by scouts before 2005, it is now on the scouting report. This includes the
players sprint time from home to 1st base as well as a player running a 60-yard dash.
This player is Freddie Freeman, current 1st baseman for the Atlanta Braves. A 60-yard
dash started getting popular at this time and will continue to carry much importance
to a players skill set, even in today’s game.
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This scouting report shows us that scouts are trying to be very short with their
notes. When they are describing a player, they do not want to write full sentences.
This is largely due to the fact that scouting departments were expanding during this
time in baseball. With that, scouting directors would have to go through hundreds of
reports on players. They only want to know the highlights of each player and the
value he can bring to the organization. There are very few comments on this report,
yet every comment is very important in describing Freddie Freeman’s ability and
future skillset.
Moving forward into todays scouting reports. You will still see the 20-80 scale
being used. Scouts will use this to describe players in the draft to their directors. The
new analytical approach will sometimes be on the scouting reports. A lot is depending
on whether the scout is able to get those kinds of numbers on a specific player. It
would not be uncommon to see exit velocity and spin rate on a report.
A lot of people may be saying, what is spin rate? Spin rate is an analytical tool
used by scouts and coaches to get a better understanding of pitches that are thrown by
a pitcher. The next chapter will talk about all the analytical tools and databases used
to describe and benefit players.
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Analytics
Over the last twenty years, analytics has begun to change the game of
baseball. Whether it is for better or for worse, that is your own decision. Many people
believe it has bettered the game and make it more fun to watch while others believe it
is taking away from the pastime and rich history this great game has established.
Many people believe the game is better without analytics. Baseball is such a
passionate game, and many have deep love for the sport and hate to see it change.
Change is exactly what is happening in baseball in the last few decades. During the
history of the sport, analytics had never been a part of it. Maybe if the technology was
there in the beginning, it would have been used. That is a question that no one can
ever answer.
A lot of old-time baseball fans have seen enough of the analytics and numbers.
They believe it has changed the game for the worse as games are lasting longer than
they ever have and the stats of players is backwards. In today’s game, home runs have
become the stat everyone wants. Front offices pay the big bucks to players who can
hit a lot of home runs. So, what is the problem with home runs and why do people not
like them? Well, it is not the home runs itself that people do not like, it is the principle
behind the fact that certain players only want to hit home runs and they do not worry
about anything else. This is the complete opposite way the game was played years
ago and why people are upset.
Back in the day, the game was all about hitting the ball and putting it in play.
Striking out was about the worst thing you could do for your team. Players did
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whatever it took to not strike out. As there are players today who still go by this
hitting philosophy, the majority however, do not. In 2019, there was a total of 42,823
strikeouts in the major leagues between every team. This was the most in any season
in Major League Baseball history. Twenty years prior, in 1999, there were 31,120
total strikeouts. You can see the drastic jump in total strikeouts in the short period of
time. The year 2000 is right about when teams started looking into the numbers more
often, and analytics became part of the game. Coincidentally, strikeouts started to
increase.
There is a lot to be said in the game today and why hitters are striking out
more often. Is it the analytics and hitters wanting to hit the ball in the air more often
which is causing them to swing and miss more often? Or could it be that players are
more athletic and stronger than they have ever been, and we are seeing the increase in
velocity? In the latest season, the average fastball was 94.9 mph, which is a very hard
fastball. This is a huge climb from when they first started tracking league average
velocity in 2002 where the average velocity of a fastball was 89 mph. That is almost a
6 mph jump on the average fastball in the MLB. What this means is, everything is
harder. Not only are fastballs, well, really fast, curveballs, sliders, and changeups are
coming in quicker as well and the hitter does not have enough time to decipher what
pitch is coming. With the increase in velocity, it is understandable to see why the
strikeout numbers have increased.
There was a recent study done in 2020 that showed the science behind hitting
a 95-mph fastball, which is just about the league average for a fastball. “Let’s start
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with some basic math. The mound is 60 feet, 6 inches from the plate. A 95-mph
fastball is traveling about 139 feet-per-second. That means it takes about 0.425
seconds to reach the plate” (Cascio). Clearly the pitch is getting to the plate very
quickly. 0.425 is fast but think about everything the hitter must do in those 0.425
seconds. They must figure out what pitch it is. Is it a fastball, curveball, slider
change-up? They need to decipher if it is a ball or a strike, they need to think of the
situation and whether that pitch is going to land in a spot that is going to produce a
good outcome. They also, of course, must decide if they are going to swing or not.
Ultimately, there is so much going on in that split second and that is what makes
baseball so difficult. As much as I understand fans saying analytics is taking away
from the game, I also feel for the players because they are doing the best they can,
and players are only getting better. There are a lot of possible reasons why the spike
in strikeouts is happening and I believe it is a mix of both worlds.
Whether you believe in it or not, it is hard to disagree that analytics can be
beneficial for front offices. No matter what kind of business you may operate, the end
goal is the same, to succeed. This may come in many different formats depending on
what you do, but for baseball it is simple, win baseball games. Front offices are
dissecting everything to put together a winning ball club. It is difficult to predict and
analyze what a player is going to do in the future. There are many techniques and
tools front offices use in today’s game that give them an advantage to do this. It is all
about finding value in players. Although this may seem easy enough, it simply is not.
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Baseball is a very simple game. It is incredibly difficult to play, but it is
simple at the same time. You throw the ball, catch the ball, hit the ball, and run. Now
everything between those areas, is where the game gets very difficult. That is the hard
decisions that the front offices have to make year in and year out to try and produce a
winning ball team. When trying to find value in players, you must simplify. As for
finding hitters, it can be best to approach offensive evaluation by runs scored. If you
cannot outscore the other team, you simply will lose. Finding value with hitters is
very difficult but there have been a few things that stick out when trying to find
valuable players. Guys who get on base and have a high on base percentage are
incredibly valuable for front offices. These may be players that are undervalued
because they may not hit 25 home runs a year, but they walk on a consistent basis and
get on base for your big hitters to drive them in. Teams are trending to value on base
percentage over batting average.
A very well-known example of this is the movie Moneyball. In this movie,
general manager Billy Beane restructured the Oakland Athletics and brought them to
the playoffs. The entire census of the movie was built around finding players who get
on base. The Athletics lost their top three players the year prior. They were trying to
find players in the free agent market that could replace everything they lost. They
soon came to realize that they did not have the budget to go out and sign free agents
that were big names and produced the best numbers. Instead, management found
three hitters who’s on base percentage totaled everything they lost. With those three
players in the lineup, it could mathematically replace the production of the one
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greater hitter they lost. The Athletics went on to make the playoffs and broke MLB’s
longest winning streak in the meantime. After this season, many teams started
following suit with the Athletics, and turned towards the analytics to win ball games.
They tried to find players who could bring value to their team for a cheaper price,
which is exactly what the Athletics did.
This kind of management does not just matter for hitters, there are many
pitchers’ statistics that help you find value in pitchers that many teams may overlook.
Although this method may not be flashy and look good, it can help you win ball
games which is simply all that matters. To do this, you can look for value in pitchers
who have a high ground ball rate percentage over a high strike out rate. Now why
would a team want this? This is incredibly valuable because with a high ground ball
rate, a pitcher is saving his bullets by keeping his pitch count at a minimum. High
strikeout pitchers are typically the players who sign the multi hundred-million-dollar
contracts in the offseason. This is because fans love to see strikeouts, and they will
buy tickets to the game to see this player. It is not uncommon to see high strike out
pitchers only go four to five innings. This is because they throw so many pitches and
have to be taken out of the game early because they are getting so many swing and
misses. So, if front offices like to look for undervalued players, how can scouts try
and find these guys?
This is where the new style of modern analytics in baseball comes into play.
While teams like the Athletics used to use on base percentage, and ground ball rate
twenty years ago, it has gone to great length since then. Teams now go to great length
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at the analytical numbers they pull up in order to find players with value. There are
many statistics that are used for pitchers. One statistic jumping off the charts recently
has been spin rate.
When a pitcher throws a baseball, it has a great amount of spin. Teams
recently started using this to value some specific pitches. Spin rate can be defined as
the rate of spin on a baseball that is measured in revolutions per minute. It is best
explained when a pitcher throws a fastball. Let’s say there are two pitchers who both
throw a 95-mph fastball. The amount of spin on both pitches can change the trajectory
of the pitch. This means, that with a higher spin rate, the pitch is going to end up in a
different spot. A high spin rate fastball can be described as “rising” when it comes to
the plate from a hitter’s perspective. Although it is not actually rising, the high
revolutions on the ball keep the ball from naturally sinking due to gravity. So, a hitter
may believe the pitch is going to end up at his ankles, but because of the high spin
rate, that pitch will stay at the hitter’s knees and ultimately be a called a strike. This
differs from a low spin rate fastball. Even though both pitches are thrown at the same
velocity, the lower spin rate fastball well have more drop to it and will be easier to hit.
Front offices are looking for pitchers with high spin rate because it is much harder to
hit. That does not mean a pitcher with low spin rate cannot be effective, because they
absolutely can be.
Over the last five years, spin rate has really come into play for front offices
more than fans would expect. Fans hear the name of a certain starting pitcher and may
think to themselves, “This is guy is not good, why in the world is our general
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manager signing him?”. The truth is, there is much more value in a starting pitcher
than just looking at his ERA (earned run average) and wins.
Table 1: Garrett Richards Spin Rate

Statcast Search. baseballsavant.com. (2015). Retrieved December 23, 2021, from
https://baseballsavant.mlb.com/statcast_search?hfPT=CU%7CKC%7C&hfAB=&hfGT=R%7C&hfPR=&hfZ=&stadium=&hfBBL=
&hfNewZones=&hfPull=&hfC=&hfSea=2021%7C&hfSit=&player_type=pitcher&hfOuts=&opponent=&pitcher_throws=&batter_st
ands=&hfSA=&game_date_gt=&game_date_lt=&hfInfield=&team=&position=&hfOutfield=&hfRO=&home_road=&hfFlag=&hfB
BT=&metric_1=&hfInn=&min_pitches=0&min_results=100&group_by=name&sort_col=spin_rate&player_event_sort=api_p_releas
e_speed&sort_order=desc&min_pas=0#results

Let’s take a look at this chart. Here, spin rate is the x-axis and xBA (expected
batting average) is the y-axis. Each red dot stands for an MLB pitcher. This graph is
charting the best curveball in comparison to spin rate with the lowest expected batting
average for that specific pitch. Garrett Richards is someone who is the clear-cut
leader in spin rate with over 3200 RPM. While his spin rate is so high and in the 99th
percentile, his xBA is incredibly low as well with just above a .150 batting average.
So, what exactly does this mean? There are a lot of circles on this graph, but
these are two numbers that will stand out for a general manager when potentially
signing or trading for a player. It shows us that with as high of a spin rate that he has,
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when the ball is put in play against this pitch, it only has a .160 chance to fall for a
base hit. In baseball sense, that is very good and well above average, for the pitcher. It
is a pitch that maybe Garrett Richards would want to throw more often.
Garrett Richards was a player with a slightly above average ERA in his 11year career so far with a 3.81. This past off-season, Richards signed with the Boston
Red Sox for $10 million dollars, which for some, may be an astronomical number. To
general managers, this is not a huge number, but it is above average. The Red Sox
found value in Garrett Richards based off his spin rate on his curveball and fastball.
While his curveball is in the 99th percentile, as we’ve seen in the chart above, his
fastball is in the 93rd percentile. These are two pitches that complement each other
really well.
Richards did not have quite the year he would have hoped, posting a 4.87
ERA which was the worst in his career. The point of this is to show the value of what
a high spin rate can have to major league front offices. Richards has an elite
curveball, and teams will take a chance on him and give him this kind of money in
hopes of him figuring out how to get more batters out with that pitch.
There are many situations where general managers sign a player because they
believe they can work with his pitches and maybe increase his spin rate. All of this is
tied together between front offices and scouts. Scouts are out looking for players who
can bring value to an organization. If a high spin rate brings value, then scouts will be
out there looking for pitchers who have high spin rates, rather than just looking for a
projectable pitcher.
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A great example of a player utilizing spin rate to his advantage is future hall
of famer, Justin Verlander. Now, it may be hard to create an example of such a great
pitcher like Verlander, but there are some numbers that stand off the chart to his
recent success.
Verlander started his career with the Detroit Tigers, and it was nothing less
than outstanding. While being named to six All-Star Games and winning an MVP and
Cy Young award, Verlander was off to a storied career. It was not until 2014 where he
saw himself not having the success he was used to. He gave up a career high 104
earned runs and many thought his career was coming to a near end in his early 30’s.
It was not until 2018 when he became an All-Star again with the Houston
Astros. In 2018 and 2019, he put up the two best seasons of his career, winning his
second Cy Young award and struck out a career high 300 hitters. So, what was the
reason for his success in Houston? Well, it may come down to a multitude of factors,
but spin rate is the one factor that jumps off the charts.
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Table 2: Justin Verlander Spin Rate by Season

Statcast Search. baseballsavant.com. (2015). Retrieved December 23, 2021, from
https://baseballsavant.mlb.com/statcast_search?hfPT=CU%7CKC%7C&hfAB=&hfGT=R%7C&hfPR=&hfZ=&stadium
=&hfBBL=&hfNewZones=&hfPull=&hfC=&hfSea=2021%7C&hfSit=&player_type=pitcher&hfOuts=&opponent=&pi
tcher_throws=&batter_stands=&hfSA=&game_date_gt=&game_date_lt=&hfInfield=&team=&position=&hfOutfield=
&hfRO=&home_road=&hfFlag=&hfBBT=&metric_1=&hfInn=&min_pitches=0&min_results=100&group_by=name&
sort_col=spin_rate&player_event_sort=api_p_release_speed&sort_order=desc&min_pas=0#results

The chart above shows Justin Verlander’s average spin rate on all his pitches
since they began recording this stat in 2015. The top blue line shows his curveball,
which is an off-speed pitch that typically is the highest spin rate of any pitch a pitcher
throws. You can see from 2015 to 2020 the drastic increase in his spin rate on this
pitch. The yellow line is a slider which is another off-speed pitch. This differs from
the curveball in that it is faster, and its break is much more horizontal. Whereas a
curveballs break is more vertical. The two off-speed pitches are thrown at different
speeds and have different break. The slider is still a pitch with very high spin and
when combined with a good curveball and fastball, it is very hard to recognize this
pitch. The red line is his 4-seam fastball which is the most common pitch in baseball.
Just about all pitchers throw a 4-seam fastball. The green line at the bottom is his
change-up which is not supposed to have a lot of spin to it. In 2015, when he
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struggled, the spin rate on his change-up was too high and this is probably a reason
why he did not see much success. The reason behind that is, if your spin rate is too
high on a change-up, it ends up looking a lot like a 4-seam fastball and the change-up
will have less movement. Ultimately, the hitter will have a better chance of hitting the
change-up if this is the case.
In just a matter of three seasons, Verlander rose his average spin rate on his
curveball from 2,457 rpm in 2015, to 2,894 rpm in 2018, a jump of 437 rpm. This is
an astronomical jump for a pitcher to be able to do this, but does it really make that
much of a difference that his spin rate increased this much? Yes, it really does.
To show how much of an effect this made on his statistics, Verlander only
struck out 113 batters in 133.1 innings pitched in 2015. Although this was a shortened
season for him the year prior in 2014, he struck out 159 batters in 206 innings
pitchers giving him a K/9 (strikeouts per nine innings) of 6.9, the lowest of his career.
By 2018, we saw these numbers change, by a lot. Verlander struck out 290 batters in
214 innings pitched giving him a 12.2 K/9, the highest of his career. It did not stop
there though. He posted a 2.52 ERA which was the second lowest in his career.
Not only did the spin rate of his curveball increase, but his fastball also
increased by 127 rpm on average in the three-year span. This was a game changer for
Verlander. In 2015, Verlander and a swing and miss percentage of 17.6% on his
curveball. In 2018, it doubled to 34.4%. A jump like that does not seem possible, but
Verlander did it. His fastball saw a drastic jump as well from 20.6% in 2015 to 29.2%
in 2018. It is no surprise that he struck out 290 batters with these kinds of numbers.
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Major League front offices are constantly trying to find situations like Justin
Verlander. They sign a player, develop some changes they see, and he becomes much
more valuable. So how much value did Justin Verlander bring to the Astros? Well, the
easy answer is, a lot.
In 2018, Justin Verlander had a WAR (wins above replacement) of 6.6. WAR
is best described as a statistic that estimates a player’s total value over an average
replacement level pitcher. What this means in whole, is that Justin Verlander by
himself, brought the Houston Astros 6.6 wins in the 2018 season. To put this in
perspective of how valuable those 6.6 wins are, the Astros won 103 games that season
and finished in first place of the American League West Division. The second-place
team was the Oakland Athletics and they finished with 97 wins which was six games
back from the Astros for first place in the division. If Justin Verlander did not pitch
for the Astros that season, they would have not won those 6.6 games and would have
fallen below the Athletics and would have finished in second place. At this point, the
Astros would have just missed the playoffs. Now, of course, this is a team sport and
maybe another player would have stepped up to help fill that role if Verlander was
irrelevant. But looking at it from a WAR perspective, Verlander was incredibly
valuable to helping the Astros win their division. FanGraphs, which is an online
database that shows MLB statistics, has a statistic for money a specific player is
worth during the season due to their production. In 2018, Justin Verlander was
estimated to be worth $52.6 million dollars. This a number that no team has ever paid
for a player and is merely just a statistic. Verlander’s actual salary in 2018 was $28
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million, which made him the sixth highest paid player in the league during that
season. Based off FanGraphs statistic, the Astros received $24.6 million more in
value for Justin Verlander during the 2018 season. It is safe to say that the increase in
spin rate helped Verlander that season.
It is no surprise why pitchers are always trying to increase their spin rate.
Numbers like those of Justin Verlander go to show how effective a high spin rate can
be for hitters to try and hit the ball. Tying this all together, it is the job of a scout to try
and find these kinds of numbers in high school, college, and minor league players.
They are constantly looking for pitchers with high spin rate, so teams do not even
have to work with them to increase their numbers. With that being said, spin rate is
not the only thing scouts are looking for in pitchers. It is a whole process and teams
want to see more than just a number on a chart. Although this number can be
incredibly effective and helpful, there is always more going on behind the scenes.
Although the actual statistic we call “spin rate” has not been around forever,
many scouts have been referring to spin rate without using that name for many
decades. In the very begging of all this, we looked at past scouting reports from the
years leading up until now. The first scouting report on here was Tom Seaver’s from
1965
On that scouting report, you will notice that the scout describes Seaver’s
fastball as having “life” on it. “Life” refers to a baseball that comes out of the
pitcher’s hand and gets on the hitter quicker than what the radar gun may say the
speed is. This has been a baseball reference that has been around for decades and is
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still used today. We now have an actual statistic to calculate “life”, and that statistic is
spin rate.
When a scout is looking for amateur baseball players for their organization to
draft, they may not have all the tools and systems to be able to know a pitcher’s spin
rate. Even on today’s scouting reports, you will see “life” being used as a description
for many pitcher’s fastballs. It takes a great scout to be able to see this in a young
pitcher. A lot of the times, a scout is looking for a pitcher with a good body and live
arm in hopes that he has or can gain spin on his pitches.
Any scout can go to a baseball game and pull out a radar gun and see that a
pitcher is throwing 92 mph just from looking at their radar gun. A great scout will be
able to look at a 21-year-old right-handed pitcher who throws 92 mph, which is good,
but not great, and see that he has a lot of life on his fastball causing many hitters to
swing and miss on his pitch. This is something where scouts can describe to their
director that this pitcher has potential. If a kid is already getting swing and misses on
a 92-mph fastball, imagine what could happen if that organization drafts him and
works with him so that he can turn that 92 mph into 95 or 96 mph.
Scouting is all about projectability and predicting a player’s future, which is
very difficult. All scouts will fail at one point or another regarding a player’s future
talents. Organizations are trying to use metrics as often as possible to try and
eliminate those failures and be more productive with the players they draft.
One of the greatest things about baseball is that there is not one mold that fits
all players. There are players who are 6’8” and there are players who are 5’5”, it just
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does not matter. If you prove that you can play the game and bring value to a ball
club, they are going to sign you. That is the beauty of having a job like a scout. You
have the ability to find any kind of player you think can play at the next level. It is a
difficult job but very fun and luxurious if you love the game of baseball.
When it comes to scouting hitters, there are so many different tangibles that a
scout is looking for. They may want to draft a player due to his ability to hit home
runs. Maybe they like the fact that a kid is one of the best defensive center fielders
they have every seen. The list goes on and on about how scouts evaluate hitters. Just
like with pitchers, there are analytical numbers that organizations will use to try and
find value in hitters. These numbers can be used on the offensive and defensive side
of the game.
Much of the process was changed within the last decade. The game of
baseball changed to a straight power over everything type of play. This was
incorporated on both sides of the field, including pitching and hitting. Teams were
more focused on pitchers throwing hard and hitters hitting home runs. This was the
trend that was getting players paid millions of dollars just for hitting home runs.
Major league front offices started rewarding players who just hit home runs
because that is what they thought excited fans enough to get them to pay for tickets
and come to games and it worked. Due to this, the revolution of launch angle came
into play. Players started transforming swings to incorporate more launch on their
swing to hit the ball in the air rather than on the ground. This changed the game and is
still in effect in today’s modern game.
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Hitting Philosophy
Not too long ago, the philosophy of hitting was to do all you can to hit a line
drive and to just put the ball in play. Teams’ offensive strategy was to get runners on
base and with that, they can manufacture runs. This included bunting more often to
get runners in scoring position, hit and runs on a regular basis, and doing everything
possible to just put the ball in play with two strikes in the count. If you bring up these
points in today’s game, you will most likely be considered “ancient” in your
philosophy.
When talking about bunting, it is in reference to a sacrifice bunt. A sacrifice
bunt can be described as a situation in which there could be a runner on first base, or
runners on first and second base with no outs. Now, there are more situation, but these
are the two in which are seen most often. The hitter at the plate will lay a bunt down
and ultimately, he is sacrificing his out to move the runner, or runners, into scoring
position with less than two outs. Ideally, this gives more possibilities for the hitter to
bring in those runners, or runner, to score.
This is exactly what managers thought was the best possible option for its
ballclub. Statistically speaking, this is not true. “The piece of analysis which was
created that destroyed the case for the sacrifice bunt is the run expectancy table, this
looks at a situation to determine how many runs you should expect to get in this
scenario based of what has happened historically” (Eassom). Below is the run
expectancy table which is ruled from the 2010-2015 MLB seasons.
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Table 3: Runs Scored Percentages

Eassom, R. (2018, October 6). Analytics and its effects on the MLB – the Bunt. Bat Flips and Nerds.
Retrieved December 23, 2021, from https://batflipsandnerds.com/2018/10/06/analytics-and-itseffects-on-the-mlb-the-bunt/

Looking at this chart can seem very confusing at first. To help understand
what these numbers are saying, I will go over the first scenario. The first example is
saying that with no runners on base, and no outs, which is the start of a new inning,
the average amount of runs scored is 0.481 (seen in green highlight). 26.8% of teams
will score a run in this situation. So, the start of every new inning, there is a 26.8%
chance the team will score at least one run.
Now, what does this chart have to do with eliminating the sacrifice bunt? A
common bunt situation is when you have a runner on first base, with no outs. In this
situation, a team would score on average .859 runs and have a 41.6% chance of
scoring. Let’s say the manager decided to give the hitter the bunt sign, and the batter
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successfully bunts the ball, and the runner is now on second base with one out. This
would be considered a perfectly executed bunt. For the situation at hand now, on
average the team would score .664 runs while scoring 39.7% of the time. If you look
at the difference between the two scenarios, the sacrifice bunt brings your teams
chance of scoring down by 1.9%.
Another very interesting scenario is runners on first and second with no one
out. The team hitting would now score on average 1.437 runs with the runs scoring
61.0% of the time. Again, the manager decides to bunt, and the hitter executes his job
and there are now runners on second and third with one out. On average, the team
now would score 1.376 runs bringing them in 67.6% of the time. Now, the sacrifice
bunt ended up giving the team an increased chance of scoring by 6.6% but decreased
their average runs scored by .061. What makes this situation very interesting and why
teams elect to not bunt as much anymore, is that now the team has much less of a
chance of scoring multiple runs. Where this situation does help though, is if it is late
in the game, and you only need to score one run. Your chances of scoring just one run
is greater but if you are looking to try and start a big inning of scoring multiple runs,
statistically speaking, sacrifice bunting is not helping your chances.
It is no surprise why teams elect to not bunt in what would be “traditional”
sacrifice bunt situations. There is still a purpose for the bunt, but statistics show you
are better off without it. The argument now is, why are we changing the game of
baseball just because the numbers say so? Well, that is a question I cannot answer.
Everyone has their own opinion on that topic, but essentially, it comes down to each
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team’s manager and front office personnel. There are teams that are more analytical
than others just as much as there are more managers that back the numbers more than
others. It is a constant battle to try and find the line that works best for your individual
team.
In conclusion, the number of bunts over the years are rapidly declining. Just
because they are declining, does that mean it works? That is the magical question that
many teams are trying to figure out now. Over time, will we see more teams trying to
bunt? Possibly. It will take a team that is less analytical to win a World Series for
teams to start questioning their approach. With less bunts in the game, that calls for
more swings and different approaches by hitters.
“In that period between the Padres’ hit-it-low memo and the first part of the
2017 season has been a shift in philosophy so dramatic it can safely be called a
revolution, with more hitters, armed with better and more extensive data than ever,
reaching the conclusion that not only are flyballs, on average, better than grounders
but that the latter are to be avoided at all costs” (Sheinin). There is a lot of
information in this statement by writer Dave Sheinin in one of his articles in the
Washington Post. This is a perfect prelude into our next section about the change in
approach from analytics over the years.
We have already talked about how analytics changed the game for managers
and players with bunting. It is all a full circle, meaning that if we are bunting less, we
must be swinging and trying to drive in runs that way more often. Seems simple
enough. Right? Well, the fact of the matter is, some things that seem excellent on
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paper, do not always turn out that way. It has been a long and extensive process to get
players to trust the data and analytics. Many veteran players played their entire
careers hitting the same way and now they are told to completely change what they
are doing. Some players it was an easy change, and some players did not even have to
make an adjustment at all.
Going back to the quote from Dave Sheinin, the first sentence talks about how
the San Diego Padres hitting philosophy in the first half of the 2017 season was a
“hit-it-low” memo. What this is referring to, is that they wanted hitters to be hitting
line drives and even ground balls, more so than fly balls. What this strategy will do is
it will crack down on strikeouts and you are forcing the defense to make a play. This
“old school” approach was very common for decades. The theory of it is that if you
are able to at the very least put the ball in play, you will be better off hitting it on the
ground. This is because you are at least giving yourself a chance to get on base
because you will not be striking out. What this also does is, it gives you a chance to
get on base from a defensive error. There is a better chance of you reaching on base
from the fielder making an error on a ground ball rather than a fly out. On a ground
ball, the fielder has the get to the ball, field the ball cleanly, and then make a good
throw. Also, you are depending on the first baseman to make the catch on that throw.
There is a lot of room for error when it comes to a ground ball. On the other side of
that, is the fly ball where the fielder just simply has to run to where the ball is and
catch it. A lot less room for error on a fly ball. That is essentially the whole
philosophy that Sheinin is talking about in the first part of his statement.

32

J.D. Martinez Part I
Over the course of history, many players have come and gone in baseball. It
takes special talent to be able to play in the Major Leagues. As hard as it is to make it
to the Major Leagues, once you get there, it does not get easier. Players are constantly
trying to make adjustments to get better at the game. It is not uncommon to see
players change their swing every few years. These players are major leaguers, why do
they change their swing if they were able to get this far? Well, that is the competitive
nature of these athletes. They are always trying to get better and adapt to the game.
Players watch each other and see how they can incorporate specific changes in their
swings. Players also incorporate analytics in their swings and adjust to the recent
times. A great example of this is current big leaguer, J.D. Martinez.
J.D. Martinez was drafted by the Houston Astros in 2009 and made his bigleague debut in 2011. Martinez did not last long in Houston. He played parts of three
seasons for them and had a .251 batting average and a .687 OPS (on base plus
slugging) in his time there. OPS is a common statistic used in baseball. If you follow
the game, it has become used a lot more often in the recent years. It tracks how well a
player can get on base, and how well they can hit for average and power. The average
OPS in the Major Leagues in 2021 was .728. Comparing that to Martinez’s .687, you
can see that he was not too successful in his short stint with the Astros. In March of
2014, the Houston Astros decided to release J.D. Martinez for his lack of play, and it
seemed that he was unable to make quality adjustments at the major league level.
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Martinez had swing problems early on in his career. He played his college
baseball career at Nova Southeastern University, a small division II school in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. He had a lot of success there, but scouts were very hesitant on
Martinez’s swing. The scouts thought that his swing had too many holes and that it
would not translate to professional baseball. This is the most difficult part of being a
scout. Seeing a kid in college who is having a lot of success but saying his swing will
not translate to professional baseball. Scouts thought Martinez had a double load and
a very “handsy” swing. Let’s break this down.
A double load is self-explanatory in meaning. In baseball, when a pitcher is
about to throw the ball, the hitter initiates his “load”. What Martinez was doing, is
loading twice, hence a double load. What this effects is your timing as a hitter. Hitters
with double loads tend to have trouble timing a high velocity fastball mixed with a
good off-speed pitch. If you are spending too much time loading, you cannot have the
reaction time to swing and hit everything that is thrown. Ultimately, scouts saw this
and thought he would only be good at the college level because the pitching is not as
strong as it is in professional baseball, he would not see success because of this
double load.
The other flaw in his swing was that it was too “handsy”. What this is
referring to is that his hands would start the swing. Ideally in a swing, a players hips
start your swing, and your hands will follow your hips. What this does is it generates
a lot of power, and a hitter is using his whole body to generate his power rather than
just his hands. A player’s hands will whip through the zone if the swing is started by
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the hips. The scouts saw that Martinez was only using his hands and figured his
power would not be a factor at the professional level unless he adjusted. The worst
aspect of being a “handsy” hitter is that your bat path is not in the zone for a long
period of time. This makes you susceptible to off-speed pitches. So not only was
Martinez not using his whole body in his swing, but his bat was also not in the zone
either. This brings us to one of the most important analytical tools in hitting that
changed the game in recent years, swing plane and launch angle.
The story of J.D. Martinez will be finished after we describe launch angle and
how it has changed the game of baseball. Martinez and launch angle go hand in hand
so understanding how it works and improving it is crucial in understanding
Martinez’s story.
Bat Path
There is a lot of baseball terminology that is very difficult to wrap your head
around if you are not completely engaged in the sport. One of those terms is a hitter
keeping his bat in the zone. This has been a huge topic of discussion for the last five
to ten seasons in baseball. It was not a completely new topic to baseball, but the
ability to implement it in swings across the league and it being such a huge focal
point was something a little newer to the baseball spectrum.
Hitting a baseball may be the hardest thing to do in all of sports. Perfecting
your swing as a player is something that every baseball player is trying to do until the
day they stop playing and their career is over. It seems like it would not be that
difficult of a task, right? I mean, we are talking about professional baseball players.
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The best baseball players in the world are making changes to their swing and trying to
get better and more efficient every single season. Anytime a successful player shares
his ideas as to what he practices getting better, players around the league always
listen. They are always looking for one little aspect that might take their career to a
new level. Keeping your bat, and more importantly the barrel of your bat, in the zone
for an extended period of time while the pitch is coming in, is what many players
have recently been working on. Twenty to thirty years ago, this was not necessarily
what players were talking about at all. It has been a change of times and the best
players are adapting to this strategy.
The teaching prior to this wave of keeping your bat in the zone, was players
were always taught to hit with their hands and throw the knob of the bat at the ball.
The theory of this is that if you just threw your hands at the ball, your swing would be
very “short”, and you would be able to adapt to any pitch no matter what the pitcher
threw you. This is not bad by any means. There are many successful hitters in
professional baseball who have used this technique over the years. It was not until
new technology had come out that players and coaches found out that these types of
hitters were not getting the best edge on hitting. Although some of them may have
been successful, your average player most likely would not be. This is because
players with this strategy are “handsy” hitters, the same type of hitter J.D. Martinez
was in college. That is the same swing scouts said would not work in professional
baseball. Certain players could get away with this because they were so athletic, and
their hand eye coordination was the best in the world. No matter what swing they had,
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they would have been able to at least hit the ball and put the ball in play. What they
did not realize though, is that they were not maximizing their potential. Many players
started watching the best players in professional baseball and they all came to the
realization that none of them were “handsy” hitters. None of these top hitters had this
theory and other players soon realized that what they were being taught was not
necessarily working. All the best players had their bats in the zone for a long time
which made them able to hit many more pitches thrown their way.
Having your bat in the zone is the key to being a successful hitter. A very
good major league hitter will have his bat in the zone for a couple of feet. An average
player may have their bat in the zone for one foot. The chances of the hitter having
their bat coming through the zone for four feet has a much greater chance to hit the
ball than the hitter whose bat is only in the zone for one foot. The whole premise of it
is that it will give you more room for error. Someone who’s bat is only in the zone for
one foot has to be almost perfect to hit the ball. To hit the ball with power, you must
be absolutely perfect. The player with four feet in the zone has three more feet to be
affective. Here is a picture to help describe the meaning of bat path.
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Figure 6: Bat Path

Proper swing plane / bat path drills: Baseball hitting aid & swing trainer: LineDrivePro trainer. Baseball Hitting Aid
Swing Trainer LineDrivePro Trainer. (2018). Retrieved December 21, 2021, from
https://baseballhittingaid.com/2018/03/proper-swing-plane-bat-path-drills/.

This picture helps give a visual to bat bath. The example at the top of the
picture is a hitter who has his bat in the zone for three or four feet. The bottom is a
picture of a hitter whose bat is only in for about one foot. As you can from the
diagram, the bottom example does not benefit a hitter that much. It shows how they
must be perfect to hit the ball with power. The highlighted area is not even covering
one full baseball. Compared to the top version which is fully covering five baseballs.
This does not mean the pitcher is throwing five baseballs. This is to show that this
player could hit any of those baseballs in that area. A good way of explaining this is
implementing off-speed pitches, such as curveballs and changeups. When you are
hitting, you tend to want to hit a fastball. The theory is because it is the most common
pitch thrown, it is typically straight, and it is a pitcher’s fastest pitch. This means that
a player must be on time to hit a pitcher’s fastball. Having your bat in the zone long
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helps a hitter hit an off-speed pitch when they are expecting a fastball. Looking at the
top of the picture with the five baseballs in the orange line, the first baseball, the one
closest to the bat, is essentially where a player is trying to hit a fastball. Now a pitcher
can fool the hitter by throwing a curveball. The purpose of this is to make the hitter
swing early. The hitter is expecting a 95-mph fastball so when the pitcher throws a
78-mph curveball, the hitter will swing and miss because he is too early. Having your
bat in the zone for a long time can eliminate you swinging a missing. For example,
the fifth ball on the orange line above could be demonstrated by a hitter who is early
but because their bat is still in the zone for a long period of time, they are still able to
make contact with the ball and give themselves an opportunity to get a hit and be on
base. The player in the bottom of the picture who is the “handsy” hitter, will swing
and miss on that curveball if the scenario is the same as just described. It is not a
matter of even being a good hitter at this point, it is just physically impossible to hit
that pitch if your bat is only in the zone for one foot.
Another area of focus with bat path is the trajectory of the swing. This is
another common theory that players wanted to change as well. We can use the picture
above as an example for this as well. Players who are “handsy” and just throw their
hands at the ball, tend to have a more level swing. Coaches around the country would
teach players to “swing down” on the ball. The theory of this is the if you swing down
on the ball and you make contact with it, the ball will have lots of backspin which
will cause the ball to go further. This was the theory and coaching method for decades
until technology showed us that you can slightly swing upward through the zone and
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still create good bat path. As you can see from the picture, a slightly upward swing
keeps a player’s bat through the zone much longer than the “downward” swing. What
many players came to realize was that they had the “downward” swing. They would
always wonder why they were not hitting to the level they wanted to, and they soon
found out that this was the reason why.
It took players many years sometimes to find this out. It was not their fault;
they just did not have the technology to find these flaws in their swings. There have
been many recent players to speak out against the mindset of a “handsy” hitter and
that what coaches have taught them throughout their careers is wrong. There is no one
way of hitting. There have still been plenty of players to play in the MLB and be
incredibly successful with a “level” swing. With that said, you will give yourself
much more room for success if you have a slightly upward swing, and your bat is in
the zone longer. If it was just easy enough to realize for players that their swings were
not made for success, then what was the sudden change that made players really see it
now? That answer is simple, technology, analytics, and launch angle.
Player Examples
When the Statcast era began in 2015, it started monitoring and tracking every
ounce of data in baseball to help get a better understanding of how players got better.
One statistic that helped players improve their swing was launch angle. “Launch
Angle represents the vertical angle at which the ball leaves a player's bat after being
struck” (mlb.com). This was very beneficial for players in determining if their swing
on average was built for hitting line drives, fly balls, or ground balls. There are
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different approaches for each hitter. Some guys want to hit fly balls so they can hit
home runs. So, players try to just hit line drives so they can stay level and if they
swing and they are slightly off, they will still make contact with the ball. Others try to
hit ground balls. A certain player may be incredibly fast that his only goal is to simply
put the ball in play no matter where it goes. Each player has their own strategy or
approach to hitting. We would start to see a shift in mindset right around 2015. “More
batters are focusing not only on hitting the ball hard but hitting the ball high into the
air. The average launch angle — the angle at which the ball flies after being hit —
rose from 10.5 degrees in 2015 to 11.5 degrees in 2016” (Sheinin). So, in just the
matter of one year, the average launch angle on batted balls in play rose one whole
degree. Seems minimal, but in the grand scheme of things, that is a lot. The analytics
started showing that the higher the launch angle was, the greater the possibility of that
ball being a hit. “Batters are adjusting their swings to hit the ball higher. Washington
Nationals slugger Daniel Murphy's average launch angle rose from 11.1 degrees in
2015 to 16.6 degrees in 2016” (Sheinin). This was very common for players to do
this. Many players were just trying to hit the ball in the air because the analytics said
they had a better chance of getting a hit. So, did this strategy work for Daniel Murphy
in 2016? Murphy ended up having the best season of his career in 2016 finishing
second in the MVP race. Murphy saw his power numbers skyrocket this season.
Murphy hit 47 doubles, 25 home runs, and 104 rbi’s. All of these were career highs
for Murphy. It turned out this the drastic change in launch angle helped Murphy have
a career season.
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The theory behind the whole strategy is that if you hit a baseball with a launch
angle between 25-35 degrees with an exit velocity of 95-mph or better, you were
going to hit a home run. Players started training every single day to replicate a swing
that would produce baseballs to be hit at a launch angle between 25-35 degrees. This
method causes players to have a slightly uphill swing if they were going to be aiming
for the degree of launch. This is all well in good for the fact that power numbers will
be going up around the league, and essentially more runs could be scored. Many
hitting coaching started implementing launch angle into their players swings.
Everything was revolved around hitting the ball in the air. Players soon realized their
value would increase if they could hit the ball into the air and get hits. Not only were
they getting hits though, but they were also hitting more extra base hits and driving in
more runs which is more valuable for a front office.
One player that many people say changed the game with launch angle is Josh
Donaldson. Donaldson is a major league baseball player, and a very good one. In
2015, he spoke out against his hitting philosophy and how what he had been taught
for years by coaches at the major league level made him an unsuccessful hitter. Josh
Donaldson was drafted in the first round back in 2007 by the Chicago Cubs.
Donaldson came up to the major leagues with the Oakland Athletics. He was a very
average player until he told the coaches and organization that he was not going to
listen to what they were teaching him. He decided he was going to implement a new
swing that he thought was going to work much better for him. His new approach was
hitting the ball into the air. That was his only mindset. “’If you look at a baseball field
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and look on the infield, there’s a lot of players there. There’s not as much grass. But
you look in the outfield, there’s fewer players and more grass. So, if you hit it in the
air, even if it’s not that hard, you have a chance. There are some outfielders who
make it more difficult. But someone who has never seen baseball before would be
like, ‘Oh, yeah. You’d probably want to hit it out there.’” (Sheinin). In retrospect,
Donaldson is saying to hit in the air to hopefully land it in the outfield where there are
less defenders. Let’s just say that Donaldson was really good at doing this. In 2015,
when Donaldson had his first full season with his swing change, he won the MVP
with the Toronto Blue Jays. Donaldson had a career year hitting 41 home runs and
123 rbi’s while batting .297. Prior to this, in 2012, Donaldson was not the same
player. In his first major league season he hit .241 with 9 home runs and 33 rbi’s.
Now, this was not a full season in the majors for him, but it was not what he had
hoped for. It was no secret anymore that trying to hit the ball in the air was very
successful for many players. Although Murphy and Donaldson are just two examples,
they were not the only ones who were successful with their swing change.
Once players around the league started seeing how successful these players
were, and secondly, how much money they were making, it was a no brainer to try
and change their own swings. Josh Donaldson is a great example of a player who
drastically increased his value with just a swing change. In 2015, before his MVP
season, Donaldson had a one-year salary worth $4.3 million. After his MVP season,
this had changed drastically. He ended up signing another contract with the Blue
Jay’s but this time it was a two-year deal worth $28.6 million. So, roughly a $14.3
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million salary per season. In the matter of one season, Donaldson increased his annual
salary by $10 million dollars, and it would not stop there. Donaldson continued to
have great success with his swing and hitting. In 2018, Donaldson signed a one-year
deal worth $23 million dollars. It is amazing how much money organizations will pay
for players who are successful at the plate and bring value to their ball club.
If players who hit the ball in the air get paid so much money, then how come
every player does not do it? It is much more difficult than it looks. It took Donaldson
countless hours to perfect his craft and become the player he is now. Changing your
swing as a major leaguer is much easier said than done. On average, it takes 10,000
swings to change a habit. Donaldson had to change many areas of his swing, so
10,000 was the absolute minimum he needed to do. There are many tools that help
players change their swing. One approach that Donaldson took was to implement
analytics into his training. “Technology like Statcast — and its TrackMan radar
element — is particularly important, because it gives hitters hard data, it allows them
to better understand their swing, and to have baselines to study when making
changes” (Sawchik). TrackMan is an analytical tool this is implemented in every
Major League Baseball stadium. “TrackMan Baseball is a 3D Doppler radar system
that precisely measures the location, trajectory and spin rate of hit and pitched
baseballs” (Marsten). All these tools are very effective in analyzing a players swing.
Players can use these tools to change their swing to maximize their power and
efficiency. TrackMan can measure exit velocity, launch angle, bat speed, and distance
to name a few.
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TrackMan is not only valuable for the hitters. There are many useful
analytical tools that pitchers use it for as well. From the start, it can tell a pitcher
where he releases the ball. It will give you the slot at which it is released. It will then
tell you exactly what pitch was thrown. Whether it is a fastball, slider, or changeup, to
name a few, it has the ability of tracking it all. It does this by measuring the spin on
the ball, also known as spin rate. Along with this, it measures a pitchers vertical and
horizontal axis which is a big factor in deciding what pitch it is. Many pitches have
different breaks and with the spin rate, that is how the machine can pick up what pitch
was thrown. A neat tool that TrackMan has is that it gives the location of the pitch.
When the pitch is thrown, it will show the strike zone on the screen, and you will be
able to depict whether it is a ball or strike from this technology as well. This is a huge
aid for pitchers to increase their pitch arsenal. Even though all this technology is
available, there are some players who decide to not use it all the time. Martinez is one
of those players, as his technology of choice is an iPad.
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J.D. Martinez Part II
J.D. Martinez is the biggest advocate for using an iPad with analyzing his
swing. Martinez is one of the greatest success stories in the MLB currently. As
alluded to earlier, Martinez had a not so perfect swing in college that ended up
transferring to his professional career early on. Once Martinez was released by the
Astros, he went back to the drawing board. He started analyzing all the best players in
the leagues swing using analytical tools. Similar to Donaldson, he was told to have a
flat, level swing. When he did not find success with this at the professional level, he
started questioning why coaches would even teach this philosophy. When he started
watching film on successful players around the league, he realized that all the best
players were hitting the ball in the air. It was time for Martinez to implement this
strategy to his swing.
Although Martinez made many changes to his swing, he took an old school
approach to it with a new school mindset. What I mean by this is, he did not live and
die by analytical measures to make a swing adjustment. He used the old school
approach of just going to hit and repeating a new swing over and over until it finally
clicked. “He created a timing mechanism with his front foot that synced his stance to
the motion of a pitcher. He lowered his hands so that, instead of swinging down at the
ball, he could quickly get the barrel working up through the strike zone on the same
plane as the pitch, driving the ball in the air” (Speier). This approach is very similar to
what Josh Donaldson was implementing in his swing as well, coincidence? The best
players in the game were trying to drive the ball in the air, and it was working.
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Martinez had seemed to fix the flaws in his swing the scouts were leery of early in his
career. He did not stop there though. Although he had went through a major swing
change, he also decided to change his approach at the plate. “He focused on letting
fastballs travel deep and driving them to the opposite field, something that allowed
him to pull breaking balls” (Speier). This was an entirely new approach for Martinez,
and one that may have been knocked down by many hitting coaches. Coaches
constantly tell hitters to try and hit breaking balls to right field, or their opposite field.
Martinez flipped this theory and decided to hit them to left field, or his pull side.
What this did was allow him to use the entire field and optimize his bat path. He was
hitting fastballs to right field and center field and then when a pitcher would try to
throw an off-speed pitch, he would still be on time and hit it to left field. In 2015,
with his new swing and approach in effect, he seemed to have it all figured out.
Martinez finished the season with 38 home runs and 102 rbi’s. It was a testament to
his hard work and dedication to changing his swing that accredited him this success.
With Martinez having so much success and becoming one of the game’s best hitters,
pitchers had to find a way to get him out. A common strategy now for pitchers is to
pitch their fastball up in the zone. With many hitters implementing this new approach
of trying to hit the ball in the air, their swing would give them a little bit of an
uppercut. Pitchers could expose this by pitching it up in the zone so the hitter could
not hit it. Many hitters were experiencing hardships with the high fastball and
Martinez was no different. Martinez would turn to analytics to help him break
through this hole in his swing.
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Figure 7: J.D. Martinez Heat Map 2014-2016

Sawchik, T. (2018, October 9). J.D. Martinez is always one step ahead. FiveThirtyEight. Retrieved December
21, 2021, from https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/j-d-martinez-is-always-one-step-ahead/.

Shown above is a heat map of Martinez’ slugging percentage from the 20142016 seasons. Outlined in black, is what would be considered the strike zone. The
chart is from the catcher’s point of view. Looking at this chart, we can see a lot of red
in the middle to low end in portions of the strike zone for Martinez. What the red
indicates is a high slugging percentage. That means Martinez hits the ball really well
in those red areas. Where you see blue or white, is where he struggles. With Martinez
hitting the middle and low-end pitches really well, that is telling pitchers that he can
hit a low fastball and more specifically, a sinker. A sinker is a type of fastball, but
right before getting to the catcher, it sinks a couple inches so the hitter will have a
tougher time to predict the location of it. Martinez seems to have no problem with
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those. How you combat this is by throwing high fastballs. As mentioned earlier, high
fastballs can be a hitter’s weakness when they have the approach of driving the ball in
the air. It is incredibly helpful to have a high spin rate fastball for this purpose. A high
spin rate fastball at the top of the zone appears as a “rising” fastball to a hitter. It is a
very difficult pitch to hit, and Martinez struggled immensely with that pitch. Looking
at the top of that chart, the top row of the strike zone is all white, except for one box.
The entire row, just one ball above the strike zone, is all white which indicates
Martinez is struggling in that location. Against four seam fastballs up in the zone, his
slugging percentage was just .347, which is incredibly low for anyone, let alone a
slugger like Martinez. Martinez found that pitchers kept trying to pitch him up in the
zone, and he began to struggle. It was back to the drawing board for Martinez to no
longer have this weakness.
Martinez was back in the cage to find out a way to hit those high fastballs. It
was not long until he was able to figure it. Shown below is the heat map from the
2017 season.
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Figure 8: J.D. Martinez Heat Map 2017

Sawchik, T. (2018, October 9). J.D. Martinez is always one step ahead. FiveThirtyEight. Retrieved December
21, 2021, from https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/j-d-martinez-is-always-one-step-ahead/.

It can be seen here that Martinez was able to hit the high fastball. In 2017,
Martinez was able to raise his slugging percentage against four seam fastballs up in
the zone to .500. This was a .153-point difference from the few seasons before, and it
turned out to be a tremendous season for Martinez. In 2017, Martinez posted a career
year up to that point. He started the season in Detroit, and at the trade deadline was
traded to the Arizona Diamondbacks to try and help them get into the post season. He
tallied 45 home runs, 104 rbi’s, and an OPS of 1.066, which was good enough for
third in the league. The success of his new swing and approach changed his career. At
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the end of the 2017 season, Martinez became a free agent. Although numerous teams
were interested in him, the Boston Red Sox were able to ink the slugger to a 5-year
deal worth $110,000,000. That season with the Red Sox, Martinez made an annual
salary of $23,750,000. Prior to this year, Martinez had never made more than
$7,000,000 in one season. It took a lot of dedication and hard work for Martinez to
get to this point of his career, but it was well worth it.
Martinez has been able to continue his success due to the fact that he is able to
track every single swing of his. Whether the swing was in a batting cage, on the field
for batting practice, or live in a game, it was getting looked it. It became his secret
recipe. What Martinez uses most, is an iPad. “For batting practice, Martinez sets up
two iPads on tripods in the cage and uses video to record each swing. With his cuts
in, Martinez retreats to the clubhouse to study the mechanics of every swing”
(Pierini). Martinez was in such a routine with his new swing, that he would analyze
every single swing he took. It may sound a little far-fetched that this is what he does,
but it works for him. It may be the single most important thing in his career. Analytics
and video have become such a daily routine for Martinez, that he simply would not be
the player he is without them.
During the 2020 season, MLB banned in game video in the clubhouse and
dugout. What this meant, is that players were unable to look at video of their swings
at any point during the game. This rule was implemented to try and stop cheating
among teams. The Houston Astros were caught in a cheating scandal for using their
technology in an unfair advantage. They were stealing signs and relaying them to the
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hitters. MLB fans went into uproar when they found out the Astros were cheating.
The news came out when the Astros won the 2017 World Series. The Astros were
attaching sensors to their bodies and banging trash cans in the dugout to give the
hitter insight on what pitch the pitcher was about to throw. To combat this, the MLB
tried taking matters into their owns by completely banning the use of technology in
dugouts.
Martinez is very well known for his in-game adjustments. He is able to watch
his swings from earlier in the game and see exactly where he is failing himself. He is
able to then later in the game, make these adjustments, and be successful. “’There are
times when I’ll go in there and say, ‘Why do I feel jumpy?’ And then I go in and look
at my video. ‘I’m not getting into my foot, I’m not getting into my knee, I’m not
loading … All right, look at it right there.’ I go in there and next at-bat it’s like a I’m
a completely different hitter” (Verducci). Not many players in the world have the
capability of watching their swing and knowing exactly what they are doing wrong.
Martinez is his best coach and has watched his swing millions of times to know when
something is going wrong. Many individuals are probably thinking “How can video
be this important for one player?”. The answer is, very important. In the 2020, season
where the MLB banned in game video, Martinez had the worst season of his career.
His batting average was a career low at .213 and only hit 7 home runs. Martinez also
struck out at a 28% rate, which is very high for him. Granted, the 2020 season was as
abnormal of a season any player has ever partaken in. It was the year of Covid-19, the
season was only 60 games. This seems like it would be an easy excuse for someone to
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use, but Martinez was not having it. He was utterly disappointed in his season and
accredited it all the lack of video. MLB would turn around and change the rule back
to normal for the 2021 season, and Martinez would find himself right back on track.
In 2021, Martinez made the All-Star team and was back to being a middle of the
order power threat for the Boston Red Sox.
Baseball is a game of routine and J.D. Martinez is one of the biggest
proponents of his routine. Being able to look at video and find ways to improve his
swing each and every day is something that made him into one of the best hitters in
the league.
Players have found success using analytics to modify their swings. There are
many examples where players were able to improve their value just by changing their
swing and following analytical trends. If players can get to the major leagues and
make changes to their game to become better, then how do baseball scouts even play
a role in a player’s ability?
We have seen a few examples where players have made it to the major
leagues and did not find success until they overhauled their swing and approach.
What this means is scouts found a player at the high school or college level that was
good, but once they were in pro ball, they did not pan out with their skills. In some
ways, this may seem like a failure for scouts. In many ways though, this is a huge
success and true sign that some scouts are excellent at what they do. Part of a scout’s
job is being able to analyze whether a player can adjust. There are so many times
where a player has all the talent in the world but are unable to adjust and continue to

52

fail. This is one of the tougher elements of being a scout. You must be able to get
inside a player’s head and judge his instincts. When scouts were watching J.D.
Martinez and Josh Donaldson, they thought they had the baseball IQ to be able to
adapt and change based on their success levels. Whether or not they thought they
would be capable of overhauling their swings at the major league level is unknown. It
is not a scout’s job to determine whether he thinks this player will make major
changes to that scale.
Scouts are able to find these kinds of players in many ways. A common trait
that scouts look for to see if a player can adjust is while they are watching this
individual player in a game. Let’s say a scout is analyzing a prospect that is a hitter at
the college level. In this hitter’s first at bat, the hitter ended up striking out. What the
scout noticed was that the pitcher pitched this hitter backwards by throwing multiple
off-speed pitches to start off the at bat. The hitter swing and missed at two curveballs
in the dirt, when he thought a fastball was coming. This would be a bad at bat for the
player, but the scout is very interested to see what comes next. In the players next at
bat, he takes the first two pitches which were curveballs that landed low in the zone
for balls. The count is now 2-0 and the hitter is in the driver’s seat looking for a pitch
he can do damage with. He ends up getting a fastball and getting a base hit. The scout
notes that this hitter can make in game adjustments with his approach. The hitter
realized that pitcher was attacking him a nontraditional way. The hitter used his
failure to his advantage and figured that the pitcher would try this philosophy again.
This did not work for the pitcher and the hitter was able to win the at bat and learn
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from his mistakes. This is a small-scale adjustment, but this is what scouts look for in
prospects. Martinez and Donaldson did this on a much larger scale, but it is all tied in
together. Martinez and Donaldson were great success stories for scouts.

54

Statistical Analysis
As we can see, the job of a scout is not an easy task. It is not always known
what the player is going to turn himself into in the future. There are many tools that
scouts, and major league front offices use to try and find talent. These “tools” that I
am referring too, are more times than not analytical tools. Numbers and predictions
play a large role in finding value in a player. Although there are many that front
offices use, one that is consistent with all teams is Microsoft Excel. There are parts of
Excel that allow you to try and predict value. In my analysis, I used the correlation
model as well as the regression model.
For this analysis, we are analyzing if there is any correlation between WAR
and the rest of the measures we are considering. First, we have WAR, which is wins
above replacement. Then we have barrels per plate appearance. This is the number of
barrels divided by the number of plate appearances that the player had. After that, you
will see that statistic which is “BBE”, and this is the batted ball event. Basically, any
time a player hits the ball in play, it is accounted for in BBE. Next, we have a
defensive statistic which is outs above average. This number takes in effect the
number of outs a player has saved. Looking at the results, we can see that barrels per
plate appearance had the greatest correlation. We can see this in the second section
because their numbers are closest to 1. Barrels per plate appearance had a .456
correlation. Now of course, every offensive and defensive statistic is important for
WAR, but this test is to see if there was one that stood out the most. Below is the
correlation analysis.
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Table 4: Correlation Analysis

In the analysis, we were able to account for 120 players with over 300 at bats
during the 2021 season. What I found interesting was how little of a correlation that
outs above average had on WAR. I had expected this number to player a bigger role
in that defensive skill is a big part of a player’s value. This will come into effect when
we run a regression model and I will explain its importance.
Table 5: Regression Model

In the above screenshot of the regression model, you will see the statistics for
“F”. We are going to run a statistic test called the “F-Test”. For this test you have H0,
where all slopes are statistically zero vs H1: where at least one of the slopes is not
statistically zero. Looking at our P-Value, which is Significance F, and that it is very
close to zero, we can then go ahead and reject H0 because the alpha is .05.
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After performing the F-test for the overall model, we can now perform the
individual t-test for each measure. First, to test barrels per plate appearance effect, we
must test the following hypothesis:
H0: population slope for barrels per plate appearance is zero. This would tell
us that this measure is not related to WAR vs. H1: population slope for barrels per
plate appearance is not zero which would indicate that this measure is related to
WAR.
Now, we can use the regression table above. Since our p-value is almost zero
and the alpha (level of significance) is assumed to be .05, we can then reject H0.
Therefore, we can now conclude that barrels per plate appearance is related to WAR
and can be used to predict WAR.
The hypothesis for BBE will be similar since: H0: population slope for BBE is
zero vs. H1: population slope for BBE is not zero which indicates that BBE is related
to WAR.
Again, we can use the regression table above. Based on the regression table
the p-value for BBE is .000013, which is under the level of significance of .05, so we
can reject H0 and conclude that BBE is related to WAR.
In regards to outs above average. We are going to use the same procedure. H0:
population slope of OAA is zero vs. H1: population of OAA is not zero.
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Again, since the p-value is .026 which is under the level of significance of .05
we reject H0 and conclude that OAA is related to WAR and can be used to predict
WAR.
Therefore, we can conclude that our regression model based on the three
measures of barrels per plate appearance, BBE, and OAA, is statistically significant
and we can use this model to predict WAR.
Table 6: Residual Output
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Above is a section from my residual analysis. There are 120 players, so I will
not show every single one of them, but this portion will give you a good example of
this model. The observation number references a specific player that was listed out in
another sheet. For example, observation 1 is in reference to Aaron Judge, outfielder
for the New York Yankees. Based off our analysis, we predicted Judge’s WAR to be
4.45. The “residuals” column shows the difference between our predicted WAR and
his actual WAR. With a 1.04 residual, that shows that Judge’s actual WAR was
roughly 5.5. Based off this number, I would expect Judge’s outs above average to be
fairly neutral. This is because OAA had a .075 correlation to WAR in our correlation
analysis. This means that if a player has neutral or average OAA, then our analysis
will be close to their actual WAR, which is correct for Aaron Judge’s case. An
example where our analysis will not be entirely accurate, is a situation where a
player’s OAA is either really good, or really bad. Let’s take a look at observation 20,
because their residual was -3.39. This observation is referring to Houston Astros
shortstop, Carlos Correa. Correa is known as one of the best defensive shortstops in
the league. He has already won one Gold Glove in his early career. My analysis
predicted his WAR to be 3.09. Our residual was -3.39 showing that the analysis is not
as accurate for this player. Well, this is because Correa’s OAA is 12, which is one of
the best in the entire MLB. As I continue to go down my residuals list, the players
with a skewed residual are in reference to a player with excellent defensive skills, or
subpar defensive skills. This model could be used to reference player value in many
ways. It is showing that offense and defense play a big role in WAR. If you are one of
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the best hitters in the league, you will have a high WAR, but it will not correlate to
someone who has excellent defense as well as hitting.
There are many different tools that players can improve on that correlate to
value in a front office. Finding players to fill these models is the job of the scout.
Many organizations will run models like this one to find what area of skill their team
lacks in. They will then find the correlation and inform the scouts what they are
searching for. For example, a front office could run a model and find out their team is
lacking defense. Their numbers indicate that they have a great offense and generate
runs, but the number of errors they make in the field is the reason why they are not
winning the number of games their model is suggesting. The scouts will then go out
and do their jobs to find players that are excellent defensively. In doing this, the team
will hopefully eliminate the number of errors they typically have, and they will win
more games. Now, if they bring in players who are excellent defenders but cannot
generate runs, is their model a failure? This is the constant battle in front offices in
trying to create a team. Therefore, many front offices leave the talent up to the scouts,
and not just analytics.
Analytics is changing the game of baseball. In doing so, the role of the scout
has changed by influencing their value in an organization. There are now many tools
that scouts can use to predict and analyze talent. Whether it is for the better, or for the
worse, is strictly opinionated. There are many front offices that will battle back and
forth between which philosophy is best. But in the end of the day, the main goal
should never change, and that goal is the win a World Series.
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